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QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS OF CONSERVATION AUCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM 
AN ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT  
Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Steven Schilizzi
 ∗ 
Abstract  
Building on available theory, this work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate 
the  budgetary  and  the  economic  performance  of  competitive  tenders  for  allocating 
conservation  contracts  to  landholders.  Experiments  have  been  replicated  in  two  different 
countries  to  check  for  robustness  of  results.  We  find  that  auctions  outperform  the  more 
traditional  fixed-price  schemes  only  in  the  one-shot  setting.  With  repetition,  the  auctions 
quickly lose their edge. Our results suggest that previous estimates of conservation auction 
performance are too optimistic. 
Keywords 
Conservation auctions, agri-environmental policy, experimental economics. 
1  Introduction  
Contracting  with  landholders  for  the  provision  of  countryside  benefits  has  become  the 
dominant instrument of EU agri-environmental policy. This policy may be seen as a form of 
government  procurement  contracting  whereby  government  purchases  public-good  type 
environmental benefits from private landholders. The increased importance of environmental 
contracting has, to date, not been reflected in innovative policy design or implementation. It 
remains the norm in EU conservation schemes to offer a single, fixed payment for compliance 
with a predetermined set of management prescriptions. One proposal that has been made to 
that  effect  is  to  put  the  conservation  tasks  up  for  tender:  landholders  are  invited  to  bid 
competitively for a limited number of conservation contracts – a standard method in other 
areas of government procurement contracting. Producers facing competition are less likely to 
‘overbid’  relative  to  their  true  compliance  costs.  Competitive  bidding  thus  reduces  over-
compensation and increases cost-effectiveness. Bidding schemes have the added advantage of 
acting as a price discovery mechanism for environmental goods and services for which there 
are no well-established markets and thus no prices.  
The diffusion of auctions into the practice of conservation management has been slow, but 
interest in auctions for purchasing conservation services from landholders has recently grown, 
especially after the BushTender trials in the state of Victoria, Australia (STONEHAM ET AL., 
2003).  In  Europe,  a  conservation  auction  has  been  trialled  in  the  state  of  North  Rhine-
Westphalia, Germany (HOLM-MÜLLER AND HILDEN, 2004). In the UK, the Challenge Fund 
Scheme relied on an auction mechanism to encourage further afforestation on private land.  
There is, to date, very little evidence about the cost-effectiveness gains of auctions vis-à-vis 
fixed-payment schemes, and what little evidence exists appears contradictory. STONEHAM ET 
AL. (2003) argue that the amount of biodiversity benefits acquired through the first round of 
BushTender auctions would have cost the government agency about seven times as much if a 
fixed-price programme had been used instead. By contrast, LATACZ-LOHMANN AND VAN DER 
HAMSVOORT  (1997)  simulate  farmers’  bidding  behaviour  in  a  hypothetical  conservation 
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scheme and find cost-effectiveness gains ranging from 16 to 29%, depending on how the 
auction was implemented and how winners were selected. CJC CONSULTANTS (2004) report 
budgetary cost-effectiveness gains of 33 to 36% for the Scottish Challenge Fund Scheme.  
This  paper  sets  out  to  investigate  the  performance  of  conservation  auctions  vis-à-vis  a 
benchmark  of  “equivalent  fixed  payments”.  The  comparison  was  made  with  the  use  of 
economic  experiments  carried  out  both  at  the  University  of  Kiel,  Germany,  and  at  the 
University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia. Because conservation auctions come in two 
possible  formats,  as  budget-constrained  (BC)  or  target-constrained  (TC)  auctions,  we 
investigate whether this choice affects the relative performance of the auction. In addition, 
since  conservation  contracts  are  usually  offered  in  multiple  bidding  rounds,  we  further 
examine whether auction performance is affected by repetition. 
2  Measuring auction performance: some theory 
Agri-environmental schemes usually have limited budgets, and applicants are accepted into 
the  scheme  until  the  budget  is  exhausted.  We  term  this  the  “budget-constrained”  (BC) 
auction. Alternatively, the regulator can specify the target to be achieved (in terms of the 
numbers of hectares to be enrolled or the units of environmental service to be bought), and 
applicants are accepted into the scheme until the target is achieved irrespective of the budget 
expenditure. This we call the target-constrained (TC) auction. Measuring the performance of 
BC conservation auctions requires one to define a budget equivalent fixed-rate scheme. This 
is the minimum uniform payment rate that would have resulted in the same total expenditure 
as  the  auction.  The  question  then  is:  has  the  auction  been  able  to  buy  more  units  of 
environmental  service  with  the  same  budget  and,  if  so,  how  much  more?  Measuring  the 
performance of TC auctions requires one to define an outcome equivalent fixed-rate scheme. 
In  this  case,  the  corresponding  uniform  payment  is  computed  as  the  minimum  fixed-rate 
payment  that  would  have  been  needed  to  achieve  the  same  outcome  (i.e.  units  of 
environmental service) as the auction.  
 
Figure 1: A conceptual framework for assessing the performance of a budget-
constrained conservation auction vis-à-vis an equivalent fixed-price scheme 
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Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework for assessing the performance of BC auctions 
against the benchmark of a budget equivalent fixed-rate scheme. It is important to understand 
that the opportunity cost curve (representing the landholders’ true costs of service provision) 
is  the  relevant  supply  curve  when  a  fixed  payment  is  offered.  Then  all  landholders  with 
opportunity costs below the fixed payment stand to gain from participation. The marginal 
participant is the one whose opportunity cost is equal to the payment rate offered. Thus, with 
a fixed payment rate pF, XF units of service will be traded. The total budget cost is represented 
by area OECXF. Under a discriminatory-price auction, by contrast, the ordered bids (not the 
opportunity cost curve) represent the supply curve. The auction creates room for bidders to 
shade  their  bids  above  their  true  opportunity  costs  and  thereby  to  secure  themselves  an 
information rent, as predicted by  LATACZ-LOHMANN  AND VAN  DER HAMSVOORT’S (1997) 
model. Bidders are accepted in the order of their bids until the budget is exhausted. The total 
budget cost is represented by area OABXD. Assuming the same budget as under the fixed-
price programme (i.e. area OABXD = area OECXF), XD units of service can be bought – more 
than under the fixed-price programme.  
3  The economic experiments  
Economic experiments were carried out both at the University of Kiel, Germany, in January 
2004 and at the University of Western Australia in Perth, Australia, in October 2004. The 
Perth  experiment  replicated  the  Kiel  experiment,  in  order  to  check  for  the  robustness  of 
results.  The  Kiel  experiment  was  carried  out  with  88  first-year  students  in  agricultural 
sciences. They were divided into two groups, one for each of the two auction formats, BC and 
TC. The auction setup referred to reductions in nitrogen fertiliser on a wheat crop, in order to 
meet EU regulations regarding limits to nitrate concentration in groundwater (50 mg/litre). 
Participants  were  offered  would-be  contracts  for  committing  themselves  to  reduce 
applications  of  nitrogen  fertiliser  from  their  currently  most  profitable  level  down  to  a 
predefined  constrained  level,  equal  to  80  kg  per  hectare.  Each  participant  was  given  a 
different  production  function  for  nitrogen  fertiliser  in  wheat  production  and  thus  faced  a 
different opportunity cost resulting from the adoption of the nitrogen reduction programme. 
Opportunity  (or  participation)  costs  were  spread  uniformly  between  €5  (the  lowest-cost 
farmer) and €264 (the highest-cost farmer). The cost range was not given, but bidders were 
told that costs were uniformly distributed. Bidders knew their own opportunity costs but not 
those of rival bidders. They were given a rough estimate of where he or she stood compared 
to rival bidders in terms of opportunity costs. This was done by informing bidders in which 
cost  quartile  they  belonged:  upper  quarter,  upper  half,  lower  half,  lower  quarter.  It  was 
assumed  that  bidders  could  look  around  and  estimate  the  number  of  competitors  in  their 
group: between 40 and 44 depending on sessions in the Kiel experiment, and 27 in the Perth 
experiment. 
Participants were told that not all of them would be able to win contracts and that they were 
therefore competing against each other. To keep things very simple, each participant could 
put up just one land unit of wheat, the same area for all participants. They were told that if 
they won a contract, they would be paid the difference between their bid and their opportunity 
cost. For both groups, three rounds were held in order to investigate the performance of the 
auctions with repetition. That is, which of the two auction formats was better able to maintain 
a good performance as bidders get to “play the game” several times? In rounds two and three, 
exactly the same setup was used, except that bidders knew of their own result in the previous 
round(s), and successful bidders had been paid their net gains at the end of each round.  
The two auction formats differed mainly with respect to the information given to, and asked 
of, the bidders. In the first round, the group playing the BC auction was informed of the 
available budget for the current session. A pre-announced budget has been common practice 
in the Australian conservation pilot auctions. The budget constraint announced (€3900) was  
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clearly distinguished from the actual payments made at the end of the session. Actual bidder 
payments were proportional to their gains calculated as own bid minus participation cost. 
Bidders were then asked to state their bid. In the following two rounds, bidders also knew 
whether they had previously been successful or not, and if so, what their net gains were. No 
information regarding other bidders was given, as e.g. the number of winners.  
To  the  TC  auction  group,  instead  of  a  budget  constraint,  the  number  of  contracts  to  be 
allocated  was  announced.  This  number  had  to  be  worked  out  immediately  after  the  BC 
auction had been held, because the target was set equal to the number of contracts allocated 
with the €3900 budget constraint. This was done in order to be able to compare the two 
auction formats on an equal footing. In the first round, the BC auction yielded 29 contracts. 
Thus the number 29 was announced to the TC auction group. The information treatment was 
identical to the BC auction. Importantly, during the first session, the two groups were not 
allowed to communicate. The TC group entered the experimental venue as the BC group 
exited by an opposite door. Tutors were present to make sure no communication happened. 
Participants were then asked to state the amount bid for a contract.  
The Perth experiment was in all points identical to the Kiel experiment, save for the following 
logistical details. The number of participants was 53 in number, split about evenly between 
the BC and TC groups. To reflect the smaller number of participants in the Perth experiment, 
the budget constraint was lowered proportionately, compared to the Kiel experiment ($2300). 
A slight difference in the Perth experiment was the twist given to the story. Rather than 
nitrogen  leaching  into  the  groundwater,  the  government  agency  was  buying  back  from 
horticulturalists in the Swan catchment (around Perth) a composite good made of nitrogen and 
phosphorus, and the problem was eutrophication in the Swan river following excess runoff of 
these two nutrients – a socially and politically sensitive issue in Perth.  
4  Results and discussion  
In evaluating auction performance, three criteria are standard: budgetary cost-effectiveness, 
information rents, and economic efficiency. The first is measured as the payment per kg of 
nitrogen (N) abated; it measures the value-for-money a government agency achieves with 
taxpayers’  money.  The  second  is  measured  as  the  payments  made  over  and  above 
participation costs. The third, economic efficiency, collapses in this case to forgone profits, 
that is, the participation or opportunity cost (OC) per kg of N abated, which measures the cost 
to society of achieving a unit of N abatement.  
Table 1 presents the results. As highlighted in section 2, auction performance is measured 
against the benchmark of a budget-equivalent fixed-rate payment which appears as MUP in 
Table 1. This is the minimum uniform payment rate (MUP) that would have resulted in the 
same  budgetary  expenditure  as  the  auction.  It  is  important  to  understand  that  the  MUP 
benchmark  is  defined  as  the  fixed-rate  payment  to  the  lowest-cost  participants  up  to  the 
budget constraint. That is, landholders are accepted into the scheme starting from the lowest 
opportunity costs (OC) until the budget is exhausted. This provides a least-cost uniform pay 
rate, a theoretical but ‘absolute’ benchmark for comparison. Of course, it can only be used 
with controlled laboratory experiments where individual OC are known with certainty. In 
practice,  policy  makers  will  not  have  this  information,  and  the  MUP  will  thus  not  be  a 
realistic benchmark for policy settings. It is more realistic to assume that policy makers and 
administrators  will  have  some  information  about  the  average  OC  of  participation  as  an 
anchoring point or benchmark for choosing the payment rate. This benchmark appears as 
ACP (‘average cost payment’) in Table 1.  
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Table  1:  BC  and  TC  auction  performance  relative  to  the  two  FRP  benchmarks,  1
st 
round  
(See Table A1 in Appendix for underlying absolute values) 
     
Kiel BC 1 
(Budget = €3900) 
Kiel TC 1 
(Target = 29 participants)  The Kiel experiment 
Auction  MUP  ACP  Auction  MUP  ACP 
Applicants (or bidders)  100  59  70  100  67  70 
Contracts awarded   100  90  72  100  100  100 
Fixed pay rate (equivalent)  100  108  139  100  124  129 
Total payment  100  97  101  100  124  129 
Total opportunity cost   100  72  72  100  91  95 
Total N abated  100  87  77  100  96  98 
             
Budgetary cost-effectiveness 
= Payment / kg N abated  100  111  131  100  129  131 
             
Information rent rate  
= Total payment / opp cost  100  135  140  100  136  136 




= Opp cost / kg N abated  100  82  94  100  94  97 
 
Perth BC 1 
(Budget = $2300) 
Perth TC 1 
(Target = 19 participants)  The Perth replicate 
Auction  MUP  ACP  Auction  MUP  ACP 
Applicants (or bidders)  100  59  74  100  73  81 
Contracts awarded  100  84  63  100  100  100 
Fixed pay rate (equivalent)  100  114  152  100  116  126 
Total payment  100  97  101  100  116  126 
Total opportunity cost  100  64  65  100  90  98 
Total N abated  100  75  64  100  88  92 
             
Budgetary cost-effectiveness 
= Payment / kg N abated  100  129  158  100  132  138 
             
Information rent rate  
= Total payment / opp cost  100  151  157  100  129  130 




= Opp cost / kg N abated  100  86  101  100  100  106 
 
BC1 and TC1 : budget- and target-constrained auctions, first round  
MUP : Minimum Uniform Payment rate (absolute benchmark)  
ACP : Average Cost Payment rate 
 
Auction  performance  in  Table  1  appears  as  100%  (or  itself),  while  the  MUP  and  ACP 
benchmarks are expressed in terms of the auction. The performance criteria appear in the 
three bottom rows in both the Kiel and the Perth tables, where a number greater than 100 
means that the auction performs better than its equivalent fixed-rate scheme. The rows above 
provide the underlying values that help to interpret the results. Note that in the BC setting the 
budget is held constant when comparing the auction to the two fixed-price benchmarks, while 
in the TC setting the number of contracts awarded is held constant. The underlying raw data 
generated by the experiments is provided in Table A1 of the Appendix.  
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Starting with budgetary cost-effectiveness as measured by the payment per kg N abated, Table 
1 shows that in all cases the auction outperforms fixed-price programmes, even the MUP. 
Relative  to  the  MUP,  this  advantage  ranges  from  11  to  32  per  cent,  that  is,  one  unit  of 
abatement paid at a fixed rate would have cost 11 to 32 per cent more than the auction. 
Relative to the more policy relevant ACP benchmark, the range is, as one would expect, 
greater. This performance advantage of the auction also holds in terms of information rents, 
indicated in Table 1 by the ratio of total payments to opportunity costs. Again, the advantage 
of the auction is greater relative to the ACP than to the MUP. In a one-shot auction setting, 
discriminatory-price bidding thus achieves a unit of abatement at least cost and minimises the 
degree of overcompensation relative to the two fixed-price benchmarks.  
In terms of economic efficiency, recall that the MUP by definition minimises the opportunity 
cost per kg N abated. This is because landholders are accepted into the programme starting 
from the lowest opportunity costs (OC) until the budget is exhausted or the target is achieved. 
Therefore, the best that an auction could do is to equal the MUP, which is the case in the 
Perth TC treatment. In the three other treatments, the MUP is up to 18 per cent more efficient 
than the auction; that is, the cost to society of a unit of N abatement is up to 18% higher. On 
the  other  hand,  relative  to  the  ACP  benchmark,  results  are  more  mixed:  in  the  Kiel 
experiment, the auction turns out to be slightly less efficient than the ACP, while the opposite 
holds for the Perth replicate. Relative to the ACP, the BC auction attracts a greater number of 
winners, namely those with higher OC, thus raising the average OC per kg of N abated. In the 
TC treatment, the explanation is less intuitive: the auction, through sufficient bid-shading, 
creates room for higher-cost participants to get selected. By contrast, in the ACP programme, 
only those participants whose OC is less than the ACP will be awarded a contract. When 
economic efficiency is the driving policy motivation, the advantage of the auction relative to 
an equivalent fixed-price programme based on [an estimate of] the average OC will be far less 
obvious than if budgetary cost-effectiveness was the main motivation.  
Let  us  now  proceed  to  consider  the  effect  of  repetition  on  auction  performance.  We  are 
interested  in  two  aspects:  the  advantage  of  the  auction  relative  to  its  fixed-payment 
benchmark, and the advantage of one auction format relative to the other. If we contrast the 
outcomes of round 1 and 3 in Table 2 (round 2 mostly having values between rounds 1 and 3), 
we observe that except in the case of the Perth-BC 3 auction, both auction formats have lost 
their edge to the MUP. In the third round, the first-round results are mostly overturned. The 
TC auction has lost its advantage even to the ACP. This confirms and refines the results by 
HAILU AND SCHILIZZI (2004) who interpret this result in terms of bidder learning. Thus, with 
repetition, an auction loses its performance advantages over fixed-rate programmes; but the 
effect is only clear-cut in the TC case, where the auction clearly performs least well in terms 
of equivalent fixed-payment rates. In the BC case, this effect remains ambiguous, if at all 
present.  While  the  BC  auction  clearly  performs  less  well  in  round  3  than  in  round  1,  it 
maintains its advantage over its fixed-price benchmarks. This suggests that the auction is 
more robust to repetition under the BC setting than under the TC setting, a result of potential 
relevance to policy.  
While  with  repetition  the  TC  loses  relative  advantage  over  the  BC  auction  in  terms  of 
budgetary  cost-effectiveness  and  information  rents,  this  appears  not  to  be  the  case  when 
economic  efficiency  is  considered:  from  Table  2,  it  appears  that  economic  efficiency 
maintains  the  relative  advantage  of  TC  over  BC,  although  the  difference  has  been 
diminishing.    8 
Table 2: Auction performance relative to MUP and ACP for different criteria (Auction 
= 100) 
       
Kiel experiment  Perth replicate  Relative auction 
performance 




Payment / kg N abated  111  131  129  158 
Total paymt / Opp Cost  135  140  151  157 
Opp Cost / kg N abated  82  94  86  101 
BC 1 
 
            
Payment / kg N abated  129  131  132  138 
Total paymt / Opp Cost  136  136  129  130 
Opp Cost / kg N abated  94  97  100  106 
TC 1 
 
            
Payment / kg N abated  98  116  106  133 
Total paymt / Opp Cost  107  115  114  124 
Opp Cost / kg N abated  91  101  93  107 
BC 3 
 
            
Payment / kg N abated  98  99  99  99 
Total paymt / Opp Cost  100  104  104  104 
Opp Cost / kg N abated  98  96  95  95 
TC 3 
 
MUP: Minimum Uniform Payment rate (absolute benchmark)  
ACP: Average Cost Payment rate 
BC and TC: budget- and target-constrained auctions, rounds 1 and 3   
In bold:   values where BC > TC  
In normal:   values where BC < TC 
In italic:   values where BC = TC  
 
Table 2 shows that the relative advantage of the auction relative to its corresponding fixed-
rate  schemes  is  slightly  but  systematically  greater  in  the  Perth  replicate  than  in  the  Kiel 
experiment.  This  would  have  been  a  concern  for  the  robustness  of  the  results  had  the 
populations  of  bidders  in  both  experiments  been  rigorously  identical.  Instead,  the  two 
populations differed in their risk attitudes, as measured by a standard certainty-equivalence 
test.
4 We hypothesise that a risk-aversion adjusted set of bids would reduce the differences 
between the two replicates and allow a meaningful comparison – a topic we leave for future 
work.  
3  Conclusions  
Some  clear  conclusions  emerge  from  this  study.  The  first  is  that  conservation  auctions 
perform better than any equivalent fixed-price scheme in a one-shot setting, where bidders 
have had no opportunity to learn from previous results. This holds for all three performance 
criteria, except when economic efficiency is measured relative to the minimum uniform fixed-
payment programme (MUP) which, by construction, yields the lowest possible cost profile.  
The second conclusion is that repetition erodes the advantage of auctions relative to fixed-
price schemes, making it possible for an auction to be outperformed by an equivalent fixed-
rate programme. Given that this effect was clearly visible in the third round in both replicates, 
we  may  conclude  that  auctions  repeated  identically  and  ceteris  paribus  erode  their 
performance edge rather quickly.  
The third issue was whether auction format matters. Results here are more subtle. In terms of 
economic efficiency, the TC format consistently outperforms BC in a one-shot auction. With 
respect to the other performance criteria, results are mixed and no clear picture emerges as to 
whether, in the one-shot setting, one format should be preferred to the other. With repetition,  
 
  9 
however, the BC auction appears to be more robust than the TC auction, which strictly lost all 
advantage over both its fixed-price benchmarks in the third round.  
These conclusions seem to be robust, in that both Kiel and Perth replicates yield comparable 
outcomes, although the auction’s advantages comes out slightly greater in the Perth replicate 
than in the Kiel experiment. We attribute this difference to different behavioural profiles of 
the two bidder populations.   
The recent surge of interest in conservation auctions has been driven by evaluation results 
from pilots carried out across Australia since 2001. STONEHAM ET AL. (2003) reported cost 
savings of several hundred per cent for the first round of the BushTender pilots in Victoria. 
The  results  from  the  present  study  suggest  that  the  gains  from  auctions  relative  to  an 
equivalent fixed-price programme are not nearly as high. In a one-shot auction, gains are 
more likely to be in the range of 10 to 60 per cent than 200 to 700 per cent. With repetition, 
gains are quickly eroded to the extent that the auction may be outperformed by a fixed-price 
programme,  as  HAILU  AND  SCHILIZZI  (2004)  have  already  highlighted.  Our  performance 
figures compare well to the 33 to 36 per cent cost-effectiveness gains reported for the Scottish 
Challenge  Funds  (CJC  CONSULTANTS,  2004),  although  these  figures  were  not  derived  in 
comparison with equivalent fixed prices.  
Our results confirm the experience gained from the US Conservation Reserve Program: when 
bidders  have  the  opportunity  to  learn  from  preceding  bidding  rounds,  they  will  use  that 
information  to  update  their  bids  and  reap  higher  rents  –  at  the  detriment  of  auction 
performance (REICHELDERFER AND BOGGESS, 1988). A possible remedy might be to change 
one or more parameters of the auction; for example, by announcing different explicit reserve 
prices or changing the budget level. The extent to which this would be true, however, is the 
subject of current research by the authors.  
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Appendix Table A1: Performance of BC and TC auctions and of the two FRP 
benchmarks, 1
st round  
     
Kiel BC 1 
(Budget = €3900) 
Kiel TC 1 
(Target = 29 participants)  The Kiel experiment 
Auction  MUP  ACP  Auction  MUP  ACP 
Applicants (or bidders)  44  26  31  43  29  30 
Contracts awarded  29  26  21  29  29  29 
Fixed pay rate (equivalent), €/ha   133  144  185  147  182  189 
Total payment, €  3861  3737  3900  4262  5269  5481 
Total opportunity cost, €  2380  1704  1722  2573  2333  2435 
Total N abated, kg  1422  1241  1092  1459  1402  1430 
             
Budgetary cost-effectiveness 
= Payment / kg N abated, €/kg  2.72  3.01  3.57  2.92  3.76  3.83 
             
Information rent rate 
= Total payment / opp cost, €/€  1.62  2.19  2.27  1.66  2.26  2.25 




= Opp cost /kg N abated, €/kg  1.67  1.37  1.58  1.76  1.66  1.70 
 
Perth BC 1 
(Budget = $2300) 
Perth TC 1 
(Target = 19 participants)  The Perth replicate 
Auction  MUP  ACP  Auction  MUP  ACP 
Applicants (or bidders)  27  16  20  26  19  21 
Contracts awarded  19  16  12  19  19  19 
Fixed pay rate (equivalent), €/ha  120  137  183  175  203  221 
Total payment, €  2274  2197  2300  3320  3857  4198 
Total opportunity cost, €  1544  991  998  2404  2162  2346 
Total N abated, kg  915  684  587  1229  1080  1128 
             
Budgetary cost-effectiveness 
=Payment /kg N abated, €/kg  2.49  3.21  3.92  2.70  3.57  3.72 
             
Information rent rate 
=Total payment / opp cost, €/€  1.47  2.22  2.31  1.38  1.78  1.79 




=Opp cost /kg N abated, €/kg  1.69  1.45  1.70  2.00  2.00  2.08 
  
FRP: Fixed Rate Payment  
BC1 and TC1 : budget- and target-constrained auctions, first round  
MUP : Minimum Uniform Payment rate (absolute benchmark)  
ACP : Average Cost Payment rate 
 
 
 
 